Posts filed under ‘Business’
Banco Santander: a rising star (but not that bright)
If you’ve been reading in the news on how Banco Santander is covering its customers over Madoff’s losses, and how it’s been cherry picking some banks in distress, as well as not using the Spanish’s government toxic assets relief measures you’ll be thinking that they are a rising star. And they are, I won’t be the one to deny that, but maybe they are not rising as much as it might look like. In any case, in comparative terms, their are enjoying a privilleged position, especially because the rest of competitors are worse off. The star ain’t that bright.
Santander, a beautiful port city in the north of Spain
Let’s focus on the bank’s last announcement where they claim to be covering their customer’s losses. Let’s go deeper into the figures for some interesting hints.
The bank is including in its 2008 books an extraordinary expense of €500 million with that purpose. Wait! Weren’t they €1,680 million?
Okay. Here’s the trick. Santander is emitting new preferential shares, creatures born half-debt half-shares. Those, in 10 years will be worth €1,680 million less any increment of the initial fund deposit and the earnings to the present date of those funds (whatever that figure might be). What is insured is the initial investment, nothing else. It will be recovered not now, but in ten years. And with no actualisation at all.
For any investor that means bearing a couple of huge opportunity costs: the one already borne and the one that lays ahead. That’s how €1,680 million transform into 500€. The preferential shares will be liquid in ten year’s time. In the meantime yielding a mere 2% per year.
So, what should an investor do? Some will think about it, if its true that, when they invested, Santander was selling these funds as their own trademark, not referring to the real custodian behind. It’s great to sell something that works well solely under your name, as long as it keeps working well! And that entails a responsibility.
But many will simply sign this rebate deal and forget about it. And with the deal the compulsory renounce of any legal claims against Santander, and the curious obligation to keep working with them for the next decade. Not too bad for many considering the alternative of entering a judicial quagmire that will carry expenses for sure as uncertain the outcome may be.
And here comes the final reflection that, from my point of view, explains many things about the Spanish banks. People in Spain, unlike in the US, take their time to assume their losses. At the moment there’s not property market in Spain as people are not selling, waiting for hint of hope to recover what they paid for it. And, as long as there are no transactions, there are no prices.
With raising unemployment covered by benefits that won’t last forever, eventually, many people will have to face reality. So will the Spanish banks. If Santander is betting that, when this moment comes, the worst will be over and the economy will be going upwards, I’m really sorry to bet in the opposite direction.
The tipping point of the crisis (are we there yet?)
It’s easy to talk about something when it has already happened. The crisis seems so predictable now (it was predictable before as well if you browse to older posts). Now the trick is about spotting the tipping point. Have we already seen the worst or are we going into a depression this time?
If we all saw it coming, why didn’t we do anything about it? Why sometimes prospects seem so grim and then, suddenly, hope seems to be around the corner?
I’ve got a theory about the tipping point, or how we are going to turn this around. It’s related to what Keynes called the animal spirits, not those of the American natives, but of John Maynard Keynes. Those that sharpen the edges of the market, turning optimism into euphory sometimes, and dismaying in despair sometimes. They are moody and impulsive, and sometimes the distance between hope and fright is as thin as a hair for them.
But the animal spirits couldn’t do anything without bodies. Inadvertently, we lend them our bodies, energies and enthusiasm. They act through us, so we should know something about them. We should feel them about to act.
Let’s read around. Who are we blaming for the crisis? The govermnents mainly, some obscure financiers, some not so obscure cons, other countries, departing leaders, distant wars… in short, we look around and find somewhere else to look at.
But this couldn’t have happened without our acquiescence. This wouldn’t be here if we all had avoided some things that, looking backwards, feel like common sense to all of us now. We didn’t have a say, yes, but we all could have had.
And how is all this going to change? How are we going to turn it around?
I can’t answer that. I am writing about when. And the when is not here yet. Only when we look inward, think of what we should be doing to change it all, when we finish the blame game and we act on responsibility instead, only then, we will have touched the bottom.
Until then, our animal spirits will keep dragging us down…
Are we in a liquidity trap? (am I blind or is this another black swan?)
Liquidity traps are one of those obscure concepts hidden into macroeconomics books. Obscure enough to occupy some marginal comment only and disputed enough to be denied by the Austrian School of Economics. Ludwig von Mises would label them as myths. But, as mytical as a black swans that have recenty decided to come out of their closets and start teambuilding in the Thames, are we going to face this myth soon as well?
When Sir John Hicks thought of the IS-LM model, he already thought of liquidity traps somehow, but it was the first Baron Keynes (also known as John Maynard Keynes) who shaped the concept (did Ludwig von Mises need a better reason to label them as myths?).
The idea is simple. With the IS-LM model, cutting the interest rate is the scape from any recession, as we make more money available into the system to boost growth and employment. But, does more available money always equate more growth?
There’s a obvious limit to this: interest rates cannot be negative (hmmm, let’s leave it like this for a minute…) so there’s obviously a limit to monetary policies, that is when rates reach zero. Are we there yet? Well, the following table borrowed from Bloomberg can help:
Regardless of the fact that we are getting there, what if the rate where monetary policy became ineffective was not zero but higher? That’s in fact the idea behind liquidity traps. What if the banks and the firms -in short, people- became risk averse enough that they preferred the liquidity of cash to offering it to others at low rates?
In other words, what happens if the free-risk situation is no longer perceived as risk-free? How should this extra aversion to lending be rewarded?
The conclusion from Keynes was that there would be a point where monetary policies would be ineffective and the economy would remain trapped in recession. Then only fiscal policy, that would be a lot of government spending, would do the trick. But are we psicologically prepared for this extra spending and increased budget deficit and debt? Will the debt attract enough financing? Will the solution even deepen the liquidity trap by substracting even more money from the private sector?
There’s still a way to have negative interest rates and that’s thanks to inflation. After all with inflation our money inside the sock loses value every day. And an expansive monetary policy should raise inflation. (hmmm, look at inflation dropping and that other scary, even mytical word too: deflation) Even though, with a low enough interest rate, and with the current global scare, many people may choose to still leave it there.
Yes, a liquidity trap is a rare think. It may have happened in Japan long ago, even in the US in the previous recession (Krugman would say, and Reisman deny). May we already be into one?
Crowding out time (more wood from the forced lenders)
Yes, right now the governments are pouring a lot of money into the system. Is it working? Can it work? Ain’t we trying to extinguish this fire the same way it started?
A well known effect in macroeconomics is the multiplicator accelerator model: there is a multiplicative effect when new investments are introduced in the economy and the economy grows in a higher rate. The other way can happen too, as the resources leave the economy and the slump is also accelerated. We are suffering this effect now, catalysed with instruments such as banks that are monetary multiplicators per se.
If we wanted to stop and reverse this effect, introducing new resources into the system, how can we do that?
The first temptation is, of course, to substitute this private money lenders for some other lenders that have no choice: the forced lenders. Yes, you guessed well. We are the tax payers. We are the forced lenders. Where private investors need trust to decide to participate, we simply have no choice.
Yes, you get the idea, our money, government’s money, gets poured down regardless the amount of trust present in the system. And the investors trust governments because they are backed by us: forced lenders.
But what happens when we pour all this money into the system? There’s another less known effect in macroeconomics, the crowding out effect. Government’s spending will substitute private initiative and occupy an even higher proportion of the economy. If the flow of money goes the way of the state, it won’t go the way of the private investors.
But then, being the state the lender and the backer of many securities, amidst this global scare, why should anyone not forced to invest in riskier assets? Investors will end up financing the treasury instead, and leaving the financial markets.
Where will the money come from to finance public companies? What will happen to suffering capital markets further short-circuited from the money flow? They might as well keeping go down the slope for a long time.
Yes, I am aware that to explain this crowding up effect, the IS/LM introduced by Sir John Hicks and Alvin Hansen needs higher interest rates that affect the unwillingness to invest to the private sector through an increased cost of capital. In the present situation, with lower costs of capital, the crowding out effect lacks the mechanism to happen.
But what if the present scare of capital turns into a similar mechanism to the increased cost of capital? What of the negative animal spirits? Can they make us disinvest from profitable companies and make them inviable? Couldn’t that make a crowding out effect too?
Meanwhile, but let me express my reservations about this stocking-more-wood process. More wood in the hands of the government, lower interest rates: more wood everywhere. Seems dangerous to my little me. Maybe our firemen should think of other options.
The ant, the grashopper and the interest rates
I sincerely wished I could write about something else, but these days I’ve been spending a great deal of the time I don’t have absorbed by the financial markets.
And I’ve come to think of Aesop’s fable (click here for the Wikipedia entry): the ants and the grasshoppers, and the way they would have related to interest rates.
Since the ants are the hard-working ones in the fable. They are the ones that build the real economy, the ones that have their savings in the bank, in the safest financial products. On the other hand the grasshoppers don’t really worry about working hard, they are prone to risk and they aim for quick profits, regardless of the consequences.
Okay, now with the interest rates. Reasonably low interest rates benefit the ants because they can access funding with a reasonable price and still get a basic return for their savings while keeping them safe for the future. After all they are risk-averse creatures.
But if the interest rates go too low, close to nil, then it’s the time for the grasshoppers. Who cares about saving, who cares about the long term while short term is cheaper and you can still carry-trade. Short-term benefits are in order, even castles in the sand if they can be sold somehow, and when there’s no limit to the castles in the sand you can build, there’s no limit to growth. Screw Kondratiev!
In the end, it seems that the ants will end up saving the grasshoppers, just like in the fables. Lesson learned… or is it not? 
Hallowed are the American taxpayers…
Hallowed are the American taxpayers
as they are the ones that will pay this huge bill,
Hallowed is the American Treasury
as it will acquire junk assets in the name of the Americans,
Hallowed are the international creditors
cos they will get increased risk premiums from a riskier debt,
Hallowed are the Feds
pushing forward a plan they don’t know if will suffice,
Hallowed is the growing debt
it will at least double in the forthcoming years,
Hallowed is the forgotten Laffer Curve
now supposed to work better if turned downwards,
Hallowed is the non-interventionist state
that implements socialist ideas in times of distress,
Hallowed are the big investment banks
allowed to merge to hide their shortcomings and ignominies,
Hallowed are the plunging assets
as they will be allowed to survive with their old values in the balance sheets,
Hallowed are the short sellers
sinners never repented from what they did in 1929,
no longer allowed to arbitrate or cover risks,
Hallowed are the politics
for they will still adore the taxes,
Hallowed are we all
for we will long feel the ripple effect of short-sighted politicians and unelected officials.
Sorry for the mental rambling, forgive me my rantings, but it’s been a hell of a week… time to change the subject though…
Lehman’s fall (or the necessary and dangerous road back to rationality and who will pay the bill)
Yes, you already know it. Lehman Brothers one and a half century of reign has ended ominously. As every corpse, it needs a hole in the ground to be buried. The problem here is that this hole is $600 billion big.
On my last post I was writing about the twins and their attempted rescue. Now we are seeing a glimpse of the real problem, that won’t stop here. AIG, brutally exposed to credit fault swaps, is going to be the next one. Who said this was going to be brief? One year of crisis, and we are still going down. The echos of ’29 are beginning to ring into the monetary authorities’ ears. But that’s another matter…
Remember when I wrote about the end of cheap money fifteen months ago? There was a graph there worth rescuing now.
Just a quick reference: M2 and M3 are common metrics or measures for money. M2 referred to domestic economies, M3 included the money that had been refuelling the economy, making stocks soar, gone into funds, hedge funds, private equity or debt. Money that, let’s say, was not 100% based on real needs of the economy but bets over bets over bets, all of them based in the perpetuation of the economy growth. Well, it didn’t.
Let’s say it another way: there was an excess of financial products relative to demand. Call it excess of offer, overcapacity, inflation, yet another bubble… Some of the products were simply traded between themselves, a huge casino where they grew interconnected, multiplied their correlated risk, while the real investors did not have a say, while the real investments were non-existent. The blue curve went too far from the red curve.
Now that the party is over agents will have to adjust accordingly. If they must be evaluated again based on the real price of their assets, things will get very ugly, very very ugly. Valuations might as well halve, employment in the financial sector will drastically be reduced as well.
What about the hero and saviour here? Well, it has been mangling with the system, saving the twins… sorry their creditors at the expense of their shareholders, never realising the road ahead was too bumpy. They have now… and it’s too late.
The great thing about capitalism is the freedom to do whatever you want with your money. When things are fine you deregulate, explore new skies, advocate for a minimum involvement from the state. I never saw any of them coming to society and saying… “wait, we want to contribute more, we want to raise that tax 20%, as our benefits have soared thrice, and give back some of our benefits to the society that has made it possible”. Nope at all. Instead it was all thanks to them. They gave us some lectures about corporate social responsibility, spent a lot of money in green branding, spent some more on carbon footprint rhetorical, and simply took the money away.
But when things get grim, the same capitalists and economic liberals are no liberals any more. The benefits were private, the losses socialised. Overnight, those same successful liberals become advocates of communism and claim that it’s not their fault: that the context is bad, the cojunture unmanageable, that volatility is impredictable, uncertainty more uncertain than ever and that the complexity that they proudly created should have been regulated from the first day. Sad, very sad.
Notwithstanding the evidence against them, we are out of options. It’s the taxpayers the ones that will have to pay the price of the party, and remember: the wealthy, those who have been irrationaly and exhuberantly gaining in this game, are the ones whose fiscal charges were reduced because they were creating growth, benefits and employment. How is that for assimetry and moral hazard?
After all this, and the suffering that will entail, there’s still hope: it’s called the survival of the fittest. But I’ll write about it another day…
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (Houston we’ve got a problem)
Even the most important (and supposedly liberal) economy in the world has its contradictions. And in this continuous deleveraging process that it’s suffering two huge pieces have fallen. Well, in fact, they have not fallen but been saved by the bell, at the last minute, by the American taxpayers. Or maybe not?
Let’s go step by step. This kind of operations are called nationalisations all over the world (and bringing them under government’s control in the US). Now the shareholders and the debtors of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have a problem. But the deleveraging process had to stopped somehow, somewhere. And that line was worth defending.
Avoiding the discussion about moral hazard, six months ago I was writing about the Financial weapons of mass destruction unleashed in the US (the party is over) and also about The new cycle of capital recovery (who’s financing your debt now?) Let’s use the same ideas now to seek coherence in the present situation.
Let’s summarise the whole reasoning and see where it leads to:
- Freddie Mac & Fannie Mae’s shareholders (and many other shareholders and creditors too) have lost a lot of money, true. We still haven’t seen that in the news, but a lot of sovereign funds must have lost fortunes. The time will come when they’ll have to account for them.
- Taxpayers will have to pay a lot of money now, true.
- The consequences could be worse if the taxpayers didn’t intervene, so it’s worth doing it, true. This line should not be crossed.
- So we do it, we nationalise Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Done. And to avoid moral hazard their shareholders must have an important loss, otherwise the system would be asymmetric. Or did any companies volunteer to share their big gains not so long ago?
- Shareholders and debt holders of those companies must be unhappy and worried about the soundness of the American economic system, reasonable. Wouldn’t you after losing that much? They’ll think twice before investing again in the US. Sensible thought, and yet that’s where our problems begin.
- Taxpayers are paying. I said that in number 2. But, can they afford the bill? The US is a country with a huge fiscal and commercial deficit, so it depends on foreign inflows of capital. Just follow the previous links to my half-year-old articles to see more.
- The taxpayers only have two ways to pay the bill: increasing taxes or further going into debt. I don’t see any of the presidential candidates advocating for higher taxes so I assume it will be the second option. The treasury will have to emit further debt, and not in small quantities. I’m approximating here but, these huge numbers are in order of the current debt volume. In other words, the US debt might be doubling because of these nationalisations.
- Doubling the debt volume means a lot about a country’s ability to repay it: it roughly halves the quality of the debt. We know that the US debt is a high quality debt, but that quality will subsequently be slashed down.
- The world has a few very important lenders, mainly Asian countries. Need I say which one? But they are not that enthusiastic with investing in the US any more. The foreign inflows into the US economy have been steadily declining in the last months.
Now for the conclusion, do we really expect the international lenders to go and help the same country that has given them important losses? Could we have an “holistic” response to keep the international lenders happy without incurring in moral hazard? Will they, after the negative experience, keep buying increasing quantities of worse quality debt?
The equation is something like this:
- ↓↓↓ availability of capital in the markets
- ↑↑↑ losses lenders and investors have suffered
- ↓↓↓ their predisposition to invest again
- ↑↑↑ increase in US debt needed
- ↓↓↓ decrease in the US debt quality
Well, there’s no easy exit to this cycle. The US will be pressured to compensate the international lenders of their loses if they want to keep capital inflows going. But isn’t that strikingly close to the definition of moral hazard? Notwithstanding, which are the other options to keep the flow going?
The deleveraging process is not quite over yet. And the US treasury is constrained between a series of conditions that cannot be all met at the same time. But worse of all, the whole country’s economy virtuous circle is broken and has turned into a vicious one. The economy is not sustainable any more. Houston we’ve got a problem.
On a positive note, there are more sides to this story. Two ideas:
- The US are the main market for those that are financing them. That means that, at least, they are financing a nation that is giving them back part of their finance and holding the activity of their industry. While this cycle exists, things won’t be so grim.
- Other economic areas don’t have this vicious circle, but are falling into stagflation instead. Even with its shortcomings, the US is still a growing economy. There are not that many around. The solvency of the US economy is still holding. And they have the resuscitated dollar.
And another Damocles sword:
- Is this the end of the intervention over Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae? Will these funds be enough? That depends on the still falling value of their assets and their growing insolvencies when people won’t be able to repay their mortgages. Who knows how much money will still have to be injected… and where else.
Back from India (and from a cultural impact)
I’ve just arrived from Delhi. In fact it has been 24 hours but, in the meantime, my mind kept wandering inbetween all kinds of different landscapes, smells and tastes until it settled back again. So many different faces, so many different paces: our hectic effort of preparing a presentation on the club lounge of a five-star hotel, the five-year-old child making his frenzied small monkey shout and dance to attract our attention and a few coins, the slow-moving cow trying to take a nap in the middle of the street and the agitated drivers trying to pass as close as possible. Definitely distances are measured differently in this huge place.
The billion cattle estimated to be alive today are more less one sixth of the estimated human population on Earth. The lucky ones live here, where they are revered and spoiled, where they can live tranquil and blissful lives, where they can thrive and be loved. It’s a wonder that there is no cow immigration process to this beautifully colored lands. If the other cows knew!
Humanity. This word takes new meaning here. So many people. We Europeans have tended to grow aseptic, almost inhumans. We hide within huge buildings of concrete, glass and steel, like the new terminal I’ve nurtured along with my peers, and we become insignificant below our not-so-functional monuments. We want them to serve as a rule to measure our cities and civilisation, instead of ourselves, our little selves.
In India you see so many people, so many happy -and not so happy- faces. The wonder is that it’s not easy to infer which faces will be happy and which won’t. Usually you won’t see that in the colours -or cost- of the robes. Humans… sometimes so happy owning nothing but conceiving nice thoughts… you never know.
This column, blog, page -whatever this is- wouldn’t be complete without the management reflection. And today it comes from Professor Geert Hofstede, of Maastricht University: “Culture is more often a source of conflict than of synergy. Cultural differences are a nuisance at best and often a disaster.”
Are they? I’m personally a cock-eyed optimist and I tend to see the positive side to it. If we kept narrow mindedly to our own culture and background, the learning process would surely be impaired. Nonetheless cultural divergences must be managed.
As a reference, it is very interesting to examine Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, built from a handful of parameters:
- Power distance or the degree of acceptance of the less favoured members of one society of the inequalities they are subjected to.
- Individualism versus collectivism, or the degree to which the members of a society are integrated into groups.
- Masculinity versus femininity, or the degree of distribution of roles between genders.
- Uncertainty avoidance or degree of tolerance to uncertainty or ambiguity.
- Long-term orientation versus short-termism.
As an example, the former dimensions applied to the Indian, Spanish and British cultural dimensions, according to the available data by Hofstede. Of course generalisations are unfair, and the Spanish profile was never actually completed, but the exercise is still interesting.
From Madrid to Barcelona’s olympic port (and a captain)
Some weeks are so hectic that you simply don’t have time to write. And if you do, it’s not because you’ve had the chance to sit back and reflect about something, but because you have some free time in-between things to be done. That’s the case for today: a few free minutes.
The day began in Madrid, in the Indian embassy, queuing for such a simple and stupid thing as a visa. It’s incredible how certain processes are still done as the last century, or even the previous one. The fact is that if you want to travel to India from Barcelona, first you must go to Madrid to get your visa. The alternative is waiting around three or four weeks to have it.
And if you went there without a warning, you’d be astonished to know that they only issue a limited number of visas, clearly outnumbered by the people that need them. So the queue starts around two hours before they open. By the time they unlock the doors, there’s enough people waiting to fill the entire waiting room. If you arrive at ten, just forget the visa. Come back tomorrow (in Spanish “vuelva usted mañana” although the Indians speak more English than Spanish). And that’s the only way for the 46 million inhabitants of Spain to visit the 1,100-million-people country.
Well. I finally made it. I was sixth on the line. Then, to the airport to take a plane back to Barcelona. And from the airport to one of Barcelona’s marinas: the Olympic port, built for Barcelona’s Olympics 15 years ago.
From air planes to boats: time to sail. That’s why I am here for. I am to renew my sailing licenses and, following legal requirements, I need several navigation hours with a captain instructor. A good way to ensure that people actually know about boats before granting them the right to sail them. That’s what I am here for.
Time for the final comment. Where is management in all this? Well. Ask it to Captain Marcos Rivera. In a ship, there’s only one captain. Such affirmation is something that we tend to forget. Authority is not a very popular value these days. It is still necessary nonetheless. Someone has to decide. There must be someone in charge, asessing the risks, analysing and drawing conclusions, and then, finally, deciding.
That doesn’t mean that he (or she) is the only one to think. That would be a great loss of value, rationality, thinking capacity, a loss of options. Empowerment is still essential (and compatible), as it is dissent. But there’s a limit to it. And when the captain decides, the others must follow.
Have you ever felt that, in a project or a workgroup, the problem was that the decisions were not actually being made? Or being enforced? Have you ever felt that authority was missing? That indecision and ambiguity was undermining the whole execution? That’s when a good methodology for making decisions is needed.
There’s a time when every task becomes critical: just give it enough wandering time and you’ll see. IT comes a time when further procrastination is no longer possible. That’s when a chieftain is needed.
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