Posts filed under ‘Economy’
The tipping point of the crisis (are we there yet?)
It’s easy to talk about something when it has already happened. The crisis seems so predictable now (it was predictable before as well if you browse to older posts). Now the trick is about spotting the tipping point. Have we already seen the worst or are we going into a depression this time?
If we all saw it coming, why didn’t we do anything about it? Why sometimes prospects seem so grim and then, suddenly, hope seems to be around the corner?
I’ve got a theory about the tipping point, or how we are going to turn this around. It’s related to what Keynes called the animal spirits, not those of the American natives, but of John Maynard Keynes. Those that sharpen the edges of the market, turning optimism into euphory sometimes, and dismaying in despair sometimes. They are moody and impulsive, and sometimes the distance between hope and fright is as thin as a hair for them.
But the animal spirits couldn’t do anything without bodies. Inadvertently, we lend them our bodies, energies and enthusiasm. They act through us, so we should know something about them. We should feel them about to act.
Let’s read around. Who are we blaming for the crisis? The govermnents mainly, some obscure financiers, some not so obscure cons, other countries, departing leaders, distant wars… in short, we look around and find somewhere else to look at.
But this couldn’t have happened without our acquiescence. This wouldn’t be here if we all had avoided some things that, looking backwards, feel like common sense to all of us now. We didn’t have a say, yes, but we all could have had.
And how is all this going to change? How are we going to turn it around?
I can’t answer that. I am writing about when. And the when is not here yet. Only when we look inward, think of what we should be doing to change it all, when we finish the blame game and we act on responsibility instead, only then, we will have touched the bottom.
Until then, our animal spirits will keep dragging us down…
Are we in a liquidity trap? (am I blind or is this another black swan?)
Liquidity traps are one of those obscure concepts hidden into macroeconomics books. Obscure enough to occupy some marginal comment only and disputed enough to be denied by the Austrian School of Economics. Ludwig von Mises would label them as myths. But, as mytical as a black swans that have recenty decided to come out of their closets and start teambuilding in the Thames, are we going to face this myth soon as well?
When Sir John Hicks thought of the IS-LM model, he already thought of liquidity traps somehow, but it was the first Baron Keynes (also known as John Maynard Keynes) who shaped the concept (did Ludwig von Mises need a better reason to label them as myths?).
The idea is simple. With the IS-LM model, cutting the interest rate is the scape from any recession, as we make more money available into the system to boost growth and employment. But, does more available money always equate more growth?
There’s a obvious limit to this: interest rates cannot be negative (hmmm, let’s leave it like this for a minute…) so there’s obviously a limit to monetary policies, that is when rates reach zero. Are we there yet? Well, the following table borrowed from Bloomberg can help:
Regardless of the fact that we are getting there, what if the rate where monetary policy became ineffective was not zero but higher? That’s in fact the idea behind liquidity traps. What if the banks and the firms -in short, people- became risk averse enough that they preferred the liquidity of cash to offering it to others at low rates?
In other words, what happens if the free-risk situation is no longer perceived as risk-free? How should this extra aversion to lending be rewarded?
The conclusion from Keynes was that there would be a point where monetary policies would be ineffective and the economy would remain trapped in recession. Then only fiscal policy, that would be a lot of government spending, would do the trick. But are we psicologically prepared for this extra spending and increased budget deficit and debt? Will the debt attract enough financing? Will the solution even deepen the liquidity trap by substracting even more money from the private sector?
There’s still a way to have negative interest rates and that’s thanks to inflation. After all with inflation our money inside the sock loses value every day. And an expansive monetary policy should raise inflation. (hmmm, look at inflation dropping and that other scary, even mytical word too: deflation) Even though, with a low enough interest rate, and with the current global scare, many people may choose to still leave it there.
Yes, a liquidity trap is a rare think. It may have happened in Japan long ago, even in the US in the previous recession (Krugman would say, and Reisman deny). May we already be into one?
Crowding out time (more wood from the forced lenders)
Yes, right now the governments are pouring a lot of money into the system. Is it working? Can it work? Ain’t we trying to extinguish this fire the same way it started?
A well known effect in macroeconomics is the multiplicator accelerator model: there is a multiplicative effect when new investments are introduced in the economy and the economy grows in a higher rate. The other way can happen too, as the resources leave the economy and the slump is also accelerated. We are suffering this effect now, catalysed with instruments such as banks that are monetary multiplicators per se.
If we wanted to stop and reverse this effect, introducing new resources into the system, how can we do that?
The first temptation is, of course, to substitute this private money lenders for some other lenders that have no choice: the forced lenders. Yes, you guessed well. We are the tax payers. We are the forced lenders. Where private investors need trust to decide to participate, we simply have no choice.
Yes, you get the idea, our money, government’s money, gets poured down regardless the amount of trust present in the system. And the investors trust governments because they are backed by us: forced lenders.
But what happens when we pour all this money into the system? There’s another less known effect in macroeconomics, the crowding out effect. Government’s spending will substitute private initiative and occupy an even higher proportion of the economy. If the flow of money goes the way of the state, it won’t go the way of the private investors.
But then, being the state the lender and the backer of many securities, amidst this global scare, why should anyone not forced to invest in riskier assets? Investors will end up financing the treasury instead, and leaving the financial markets.
Where will the money come from to finance public companies? What will happen to suffering capital markets further short-circuited from the money flow? They might as well keeping go down the slope for a long time.
Yes, I am aware that to explain this crowding up effect, the IS/LM introduced by Sir John Hicks and Alvin Hansen needs higher interest rates that affect the unwillingness to invest to the private sector through an increased cost of capital. In the present situation, with lower costs of capital, the crowding out effect lacks the mechanism to happen.
But what if the present scare of capital turns into a similar mechanism to the increased cost of capital? What of the negative animal spirits? Can they make us disinvest from profitable companies and make them inviable? Couldn’t that make a crowding out effect too?
Meanwhile, but let me express my reservations about this stocking-more-wood process. More wood in the hands of the government, lower interest rates: more wood everywhere. Seems dangerous to my little me. Maybe our firemen should think of other options.
Thinking of Walter Bagehot (forgotten panics and not-so-forgotten bankers)
After a weekend in Henley closing the strategic marketing and global business environment modules, and endless talks about the capital markets, including a valuable late-hour conversation in the plane with an economist whose expertise are intangibles, I felt I needed to dwell on the past knowledge to gain some perspective on the issue.
And who better than Walter Bagehot and his Lombard Street. I’d rather externalise the explanation on who’s Walter Bagehot using Wikipedia, but it suffices to say that he was the chief editor of the Economist, as well as a banker, and had studied mathematics and philosophy. What’s more interesting, that was in 1873.
1873 was also a year of panic: another crisis that lasted for four years (roughly like the 1929s’ depression), beginning with a mortgage crisis, another link worth externalising to the Chronicle Review. (Thanks to Brisebois 
)
Many will see analogies between what has happened in the past and what’s happening today. Even though, we tend not to care about what happened so long ago (or maybe not that long) and good lessons are simply forgotten. We could know so much if we simply didn’t collectively forget!
Because, in times of panic, what should a central bank do? Bagehot thought “that it must in time of panic do what all other similar banks must do; that in time of panic it must advance freely and vigorously to the public out of the reserve.”
But still a conditions for the intervention: “first that these loans should only be made at a very high rate of interest. This will operate as a heavy fine on unreasonable timidity, and will prevent the
greatest number of applications by persons who do not require it. The rate should be raised early in the panic, so that the fine may be paid early; that no one may borrow out of idle precaution without paying well for it; that the Banking reserve may be protected as far as possible.”
Where should we stop? “that at this rate these advances should be made on all good
banking securities, and as largely as the public ask for them. [...] But if securities, really good and usually convertible, are refused by the Bank, the alarm will not abate, the other loans made will fail in obtaining their end, and the panic will become worse and worse.”
“The only safe plan for the Bank is the brave plan, to lend in a panic on every kind of current security, or every sort on which money is ordinarily and usually lent. This policy may not save the Bank; but if it do not, nothing will save it.”
After all, some things could be done much better, but doing nothing leaves us all worse off. Guess what, the alternative was also tried a lot of years before, in the panic of 1825, also another long-lost panic, when “the Bank of England at first acted as unwisely as it was possible to act. [...] The reserve being very small, it endeavoured to protect that reserve by lending as little as possible. The result was a period of frantic and almost inconceivable violence; scarcely any one knew whom to trust; credit was almost suspended; the country was [...] within twenty-four hours of a state of barter. Applications for assistance were made to the Government, but [...] the Government refused to act…”
Ring a bell, maybe?
The ant, the grashopper and the interest rates
I sincerely wished I could write about something else, but these days I’ve been spending a great deal of the time I don’t have absorbed by the financial markets.
And I’ve come to think of Aesop’s fable (click here for the Wikipedia entry): the ants and the grasshoppers, and the way they would have related to interest rates.
Since the ants are the hard-working ones in the fable. They are the ones that build the real economy, the ones that have their savings in the bank, in the safest financial products. On the other hand the grasshoppers don’t really worry about working hard, they are prone to risk and they aim for quick profits, regardless of the consequences.
Okay, now with the interest rates. Reasonably low interest rates benefit the ants because they can access funding with a reasonable price and still get a basic return for their savings while keeping them safe for the future. After all they are risk-averse creatures.
But if the interest rates go too low, close to nil, then it’s the time for the grasshoppers. Who cares about saving, who cares about the long term while short term is cheaper and you can still carry-trade. Short-term benefits are in order, even castles in the sand if they can be sold somehow, and when there’s no limit to the castles in the sand you can build, there’s no limit to growth. Screw Kondratiev!
In the end, it seems that the ants will end up saving the grasshoppers, just like in the fables. Lesson learned… or is it not? 
Lehman’s fall (or the necessary and dangerous road back to rationality and who will pay the bill)
Yes, you already know it. Lehman Brothers one and a half century of reign has ended ominously. As every corpse, it needs a hole in the ground to be buried. The problem here is that this hole is $600 billion big.
On my last post I was writing about the twins and their attempted rescue. Now we are seeing a glimpse of the real problem, that won’t stop here. AIG, brutally exposed to credit fault swaps, is going to be the next one. Who said this was going to be brief? One year of crisis, and we are still going down. The echos of ’29 are beginning to ring into the monetary authorities’ ears. But that’s another matter…
Remember when I wrote about the end of cheap money fifteen months ago? There was a graph there worth rescuing now.
Just a quick reference: M2 and M3 are common metrics or measures for money. M2 referred to domestic economies, M3 included the money that had been refuelling the economy, making stocks soar, gone into funds, hedge funds, private equity or debt. Money that, let’s say, was not 100% based on real needs of the economy but bets over bets over bets, all of them based in the perpetuation of the economy growth. Well, it didn’t.
Let’s say it another way: there was an excess of financial products relative to demand. Call it excess of offer, overcapacity, inflation, yet another bubble… Some of the products were simply traded between themselves, a huge casino where they grew interconnected, multiplied their correlated risk, while the real investors did not have a say, while the real investments were non-existent. The blue curve went too far from the red curve.
Now that the party is over agents will have to adjust accordingly. If they must be evaluated again based on the real price of their assets, things will get very ugly, very very ugly. Valuations might as well halve, employment in the financial sector will drastically be reduced as well.
What about the hero and saviour here? Well, it has been mangling with the system, saving the twins… sorry their creditors at the expense of their shareholders, never realising the road ahead was too bumpy. They have now… and it’s too late.
The great thing about capitalism is the freedom to do whatever you want with your money. When things are fine you deregulate, explore new skies, advocate for a minimum involvement from the state. I never saw any of them coming to society and saying… “wait, we want to contribute more, we want to raise that tax 20%, as our benefits have soared thrice, and give back some of our benefits to the society that has made it possible”. Nope at all. Instead it was all thanks to them. They gave us some lectures about corporate social responsibility, spent a lot of money in green branding, spent some more on carbon footprint rhetorical, and simply took the money away.
But when things get grim, the same capitalists and economic liberals are no liberals any more. The benefits were private, the losses socialised. Overnight, those same successful liberals become advocates of communism and claim that it’s not their fault: that the context is bad, the cojunture unmanageable, that volatility is impredictable, uncertainty more uncertain than ever and that the complexity that they proudly created should have been regulated from the first day. Sad, very sad.
Notwithstanding the evidence against them, we are out of options. It’s the taxpayers the ones that will have to pay the price of the party, and remember: the wealthy, those who have been irrationaly and exhuberantly gaining in this game, are the ones whose fiscal charges were reduced because they were creating growth, benefits and employment. How is that for assimetry and moral hazard?
After all this, and the suffering that will entail, there’s still hope: it’s called the survival of the fittest. But I’ll write about it another day…
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (Houston we’ve got a problem)
Even the most important (and supposedly liberal) economy in the world has its contradictions. And in this continuous deleveraging process that it’s suffering two huge pieces have fallen. Well, in fact, they have not fallen but been saved by the bell, at the last minute, by the American taxpayers. Or maybe not?
Let’s go step by step. This kind of operations are called nationalisations all over the world (and bringing them under government’s control in the US). Now the shareholders and the debtors of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have a problem. But the deleveraging process had to stopped somehow, somewhere. And that line was worth defending.
Avoiding the discussion about moral hazard, six months ago I was writing about the Financial weapons of mass destruction unleashed in the US (the party is over) and also about The new cycle of capital recovery (who’s financing your debt now?) Let’s use the same ideas now to seek coherence in the present situation.
Let’s summarise the whole reasoning and see where it leads to:
- Freddie Mac & Fannie Mae’s shareholders (and many other shareholders and creditors too) have lost a lot of money, true. We still haven’t seen that in the news, but a lot of sovereign funds must have lost fortunes. The time will come when they’ll have to account for them.
- Taxpayers will have to pay a lot of money now, true.
- The consequences could be worse if the taxpayers didn’t intervene, so it’s worth doing it, true. This line should not be crossed.
- So we do it, we nationalise Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Done. And to avoid moral hazard their shareholders must have an important loss, otherwise the system would be asymmetric. Or did any companies volunteer to share their big gains not so long ago?
- Shareholders and debt holders of those companies must be unhappy and worried about the soundness of the American economic system, reasonable. Wouldn’t you after losing that much? They’ll think twice before investing again in the US. Sensible thought, and yet that’s where our problems begin.
- Taxpayers are paying. I said that in number 2. But, can they afford the bill? The US is a country with a huge fiscal and commercial deficit, so it depends on foreign inflows of capital. Just follow the previous links to my half-year-old articles to see more.
- The taxpayers only have two ways to pay the bill: increasing taxes or further going into debt. I don’t see any of the presidential candidates advocating for higher taxes so I assume it will be the second option. The treasury will have to emit further debt, and not in small quantities. I’m approximating here but, these huge numbers are in order of the current debt volume. In other words, the US debt might be doubling because of these nationalisations.
- Doubling the debt volume means a lot about a country’s ability to repay it: it roughly halves the quality of the debt. We know that the US debt is a high quality debt, but that quality will subsequently be slashed down.
- The world has a few very important lenders, mainly Asian countries. Need I say which one? But they are not that enthusiastic with investing in the US any more. The foreign inflows into the US economy have been steadily declining in the last months.
Now for the conclusion, do we really expect the international lenders to go and help the same country that has given them important losses? Could we have an “holistic” response to keep the international lenders happy without incurring in moral hazard? Will they, after the negative experience, keep buying increasing quantities of worse quality debt?
The equation is something like this:
- ↓↓↓ availability of capital in the markets
- ↑↑↑ losses lenders and investors have suffered
- ↓↓↓ their predisposition to invest again
- ↑↑↑ increase in US debt needed
- ↓↓↓ decrease in the US debt quality
Well, there’s no easy exit to this cycle. The US will be pressured to compensate the international lenders of their loses if they want to keep capital inflows going. But isn’t that strikingly close to the definition of moral hazard? Notwithstanding, which are the other options to keep the flow going?
The deleveraging process is not quite over yet. And the US treasury is constrained between a series of conditions that cannot be all met at the same time. But worse of all, the whole country’s economy virtuous circle is broken and has turned into a vicious one. The economy is not sustainable any more. Houston we’ve got a problem.
On a positive note, there are more sides to this story. Two ideas:
- The US are the main market for those that are financing them. That means that, at least, they are financing a nation that is giving them back part of their finance and holding the activity of their industry. While this cycle exists, things won’t be so grim.
- Other economic areas don’t have this vicious circle, but are falling into stagflation instead. Even with its shortcomings, the US is still a growing economy. There are not that many around. The solvency of the US economy is still holding. And they have the resuscitated dollar.
And another Damocles sword:
- Is this the end of the intervention over Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae? Will these funds be enough? That depends on the still falling value of their assets and their growing insolvencies when people won’t be able to repay their mortgages. Who knows how much money will still have to be injected… and where else.
The new cycle of capital recovery (who’s financing your debt now?)
Following with the article Financial weapons of mass destruction unleashed in the US (the party is over) that I recently wrote, it seems like the liquidity storm is enjoying some calm. Not a bad thing when liquidity is the tip of the solvency iceberg, and when investors need a break in the increasingly bearish market.
Yes, it all began with an excess of funds that permitted spending in excess. And from that excess, excessive and ultra sophisticated imaginative investing products were made. The trouble is that they were so complicated that the risk wasn’t understood enough, or simply ignored. Now the risk has resurfaced again and debt ratings are on its way down.
In that scenario we had several options: to cut the excessive spending or to find new lenders. Looks like we’ve encountered some new ones.
The first are the public lenders, also known as monetary authorities. By increasing the monetary mass, and providing low-term credit to low rates, we have financed ourselves. Not a bad thing to do if we were a socialist economy, which we are not. But time will say if we have many other options. I fear we don’t.
Wait, there’s still another option. The ones that actually created the liquidity bubble are coming to our rescue. After all they are the ones benefiting from selling 100$ barrels of dark oil. And now they can come to rescue our banks, our real state using sovereign funds. Suspiciously these new lenders remind me a lot of the old ones…
Both refuel the shrinking bubble in the hope of inflating it again, but in the meantime the true inflation is rising and growth going down the slope. Either we finance ourselves or we trust in opaque investment artefacts coming from non-democratic countries.
But this time, if we are being refinanced, it will be either at higher rates or lower prices, there’s no way to ignore the risk. Are we really aware of the costs of refinancing? Are we facing the real issue here? Reality tends to be stubborn.
Financial weapons of mass destruction unleashed in the US (the party is over)
It supposedly began with a bubble. Just another bubble like the one I described on The South Sea Company (or how Sir Isaac Newton spurned the dismal science). The bubble was fuelled by an excess of liquidity. It had to end someday. We learned the word subprimes. We knew it had to mean trouble.
Liquidity injections were administered and succeeded. But they were just patches for a bigger problem. And then they asymmetrised the risk: there were institutions willing to provide liquidity when needed, to reward higher risks, to stimulate the economy further up and away from reality. Until the moral hazard was too huge.
And then it ended too abruptly. The wells of money simply drained and, those whose business was to ensure the efficient distribution of liquidity between the different players just became inefficient. From excess to world wide scarcity, even for sound projects. It became a financial crises.
Few crises have been so focused on the financial system like this one. Because that’s what’s really in trouble here, the whole financial system. I began in the UK with Northern Rock, now nationalised thanks to Alistair Darling. In the meantime Daniel Bouton from Societe Generale didn’t know what was happening in his bank until he lost more than his reputation. And the Swiss face value is also in an all-time-low: just take a look at UBS and Credit Suisse (also First Boston).
But where really is too darn hot is in the US. Bearn Sterns is in flames, expiring his final breath. Bought by $270 million, it was valued about $20.000 million one year ago. A 85-year-old Wall Street institution simply died.
And those that bought companies using leveraging, namely private equity, now see the liabilities piling on top of the roof. Take a look at Blackstone: their profit for the last quarter was less than a half of what was expected, and dropping. Of course its value is dropping too.
We gave it complete freedom. They took it. They invested again and again in the same risky assets, albeit chopped and transformed so they didn’t look like they were the same: collateralised debt, mortgage insurances, mortgage reinsurances, credit swaps and all kinds of derivatives that were the same dog, different collar.
And when the system was in trouble: more liquidity. Await for some more in the next days. New bolts and flashes from the Fed to try to contain it all. But no regulations… in any case it would be too late for that. And always paying a huge price in inflation… until that game is not longer possible.
The dollar’s dropping. The safe heaven for savings all over the world that financed the US debt has ended. If you add up the soaring energy prices, and the huge public deficits, the US credibility is under minimum. The country risk is dangerously rising… no more overspending, no more cheap financing, the party is over.
Economy cycles, Schumpeter and tumbling again.
One of the great aportations of Schumpeter was his approach to the Economy from different points of view, not just from a mathematical, technical or mechanical one, but from the diverse social sciences: human history, sociology, anthropology and even psychology.
I love his concept of the business cycles. They are based on the creative destruction idea. That’s the process that the entrepreneur leads, supported by innovation, to destroy the old way processes were run and substitutes them for new ones. Destruction and creation both at the same time. That means a whole cycle: birth and death. That was in 1911.
But Schumpeter wasn’t the only one talking about cycles. Kitchin also did, in1923, from Harvard. His cycles were bigger than the already well known seasonal cycles, lasting for approximately four years. They were to be known as stocking/destocking cycles.
The legend says that Rothschild had already discovered the cycles before, on Wall Street, around the beginning of the XXth Century. But, instead of making his name famous, decided to use them to fill his pockets. A group of investors followed and, with the help of mathematicians, they found a 41-month investing stock cycle in 1912. If they became rich, they didn’t become rich enough: as of today we don’t know their names. And the cycles are still named after Kitchin (slimmed down to 40 months).
Later, new longer cycles were supposedly discovered: Juglar cycles, around 9-10 years and Kuznets cycles, around 15-20 years…
And there are also Kondratiev waves, around 48-60 years, and the most disputed of them all. There are supposedly a few Kondratiev cycles identified: The Industrial Revolution (1787-1842), The Bourgeois Kondratiev (1843-1897), The Neo-Mercantilist Kondratiev (1898-1950?) and the The Fourth Kondratiev (1950?- 2010?). The numbers with interrogation marks are of course just approximations written long ago. Could we be close to the end of the Fourth Kondratiev? In any case the projections didn’t know anything about subprimes, wars or energy prices. And Nikolai Kondratiev was a Soviet economist (not that the fact discredits him but he was kind of eager to prove that Western capitalist economies were susceptible to high performance volatility opposed to planned ones).
But, even not having any cycle under his name (an injustice from my point of view) it was Schumpeter who already identified and described the four phases of every cycle: boom- recession-depression-recovery. It’s the existence of the four phases that converts a fluctuation into a cycle. A stubborn aspect of reality that tends to repeat itself (not only in Economy though). This page of the National Bureau of Economic Research about Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions is interesting enough.
Yet again cycles catch so many off-guard. It’s interesting to see…
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